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Het boek opent met Lyotards invloedrijke definitie van het postmoderne als 'ongeloof in metanarratieven', waar metanarratieven moeten begrepen worden als totaliserende verhalen over de plaats en geschiedenis van de mensheid die de huidige maatschappij en haar structuren legitimeert. Terwijl in traditionele maatschappijen gedomineerd worden door een narratief dat het heden legitimeert in termen van het verleden ('het is op deze manier ontstaan en zal altijd zo opnieuw gebeuren'), typeren moderne maatschappijen zich door een legitimatie vanuit de toekomst. Lyotard denkt in eerste plaats aan twee zulke metanarratieven: (1) de geschiedenis als toewerkend naar sociale [[Verlichting (stroming)|Verlichting]] en [[emancipatie]] en (2) kennis als toewerkend naar een volledig begrip van de werkelijkheid (dat Lyotard linkt met het project van [[Hegel]]).
Deze opdeling is echter slechts een opstap om te komen tot een evaluatie van de plaats van kennis in onze huidige postmoderne maatschappij. Volgens Lyotard heeft kennis een centrale plaats ingenomen in westerse maatschappijen sinds de [[Tweede Wereldoorlog]], dat Lyotard in de eerste plaats typeert door een toenemende [[digitalisering]]. In het huidige [[informatietijdperk]] is de vraag van kennis bovendien verbonden met die van [[macht (sociale wetenschappen)|macht]] en bestuur: meer kennis betekent meer macht en deze kennis, en haar [[databankdatabase]]ens moeten bovendien beheerd worden, wat volgens Lyotard ook de vraag van wie toegang tot deze kennis zal hebben oproept.
Volgens Lyotard dringt ook hier bij deze kennisproductie de vraag naar legitimatie op: wat is de legitimering in onze maatschappij dat het nodig of rechtvaardig maakt dat we zo inzetten op de productie van kennis en technologie? Volgens Lyotard is het klassieke moderne antwoord hierop onhoudbaar geworden: we geloven niet langer in een metanarratief van emancipatie of van totale kennis (in latere werken zal Lyotard steeds wijzen op, onder meer, het tegenvoorbeeld van [[Auschwitz]]). De postmoderne maatschappij typeert zich daarom ook door een diversiteit aan wat Lyotard [[taalspel]]en zal noemen, in navolging van [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]]. De regels die bepalen wat gepast en ongepast is op school, in de kerk, thuis of op het werk worden niet langer bepaald door een overkoepelend betekeniskader maar verschillen van taalspel tot taalspel.
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Tegelijkertijd wijst Lyotard er wel op dat er toch een nieuwe vorm van dominatie aan het optreden is, namelijk van het wetenschappelijk spreken. Het wetenschappelijk spreken kent echter geen interne legitimatie, aangezien het verschilt van narratief spreken doordat het enkel beschrijft wat ''is'' zonder te zeggen wat ''moet'' (zoals narratieve kennis wel doet). Wetenschap dreigt zo de andere taalspelen te verdrukken, maar wordt bovendien zelf gekenmerkt door een specifieke nieuwe vorm van legitimatie: performativiteit. Kennisproductie wordt volgens Lyotard in een postmoderne maatschappij niet langer gelegitimeerd door een metanarratief, maar door een praktisch criterium, namelijk dat het leidt tot nieuwe toepassingen of efficiëntiewinsten van het systeem. Dit heeft voor Lyotard vergaande gevolgen voor de manier waarop onderzoek en onderwijs dreigen te worden ingericht. Onderzoek wordt vooral geevalueerd in functie van de impact en praktische gevolgen het zal hebben; studenten worden niet meer onderwezen wat waar is, maar wat nuttig is en gebruikt kan worden.
The method Lyotard chooses to use in his investigations is that of language games. Lyotard writes that the developments in postmodernity he is dealing with have been largely concerned with language: ‘phonology and theories of linguistics, problems of communication and cybernetics, modern theories of algebra and informatics, computers and their languages, problems of translation and the search for areas of compatibility among computer languages, problems of information storage and data banks, telematics and the perfection of intelligent terminals, paradoxology.’ Lyotard’s use of language games is derived from Ludwig Wittgenstein. The theory of language games means that each of the various categories of utterance can be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which they can be put. Lyotard makes three particularly important observations about language games. Firstly, the rules of language games do not carry within themselves their own legitimation, but are subject to a “contract” between “players” (interlocutors). Secondly, if there are no rules there is no game and even a small change in the rules changes the game. Thirdly, every utterance should be thought of as a “move” in a game. Different types of utterances, as identified by Wittgenstein, pertain to different types of language games. Lyotard gives us a few examples of types of utterances. The “denotative” is an utterance which attempts to correctly identify the object or referent to which it refers (such as “Snow is white”). The “performative” is an utterance which is itself a performance of an act to which it refers (such as “I promise”). The “prescriptive” is an utterance which instructs, recommends, requests, or commands (such as “Give me money”). For both Wittgenstein and Lyotard, language games are incommensurable, and moves in one language game cannot be translated into moves in another language game. For example, we cannot judge what ought to be the case (a prescriptive) from what is the case (a denotative.)
Ook hier dreigt voor Lyotard weer een uitsluiting plaats te vinden, namelijk van spelers of zelfs gehele taalspelen die niet aan de eisen van performativiteit lijken te voldoen. Hij wijst er bovendien op dat in onderzoek de grote doorbraken juist vaak gebeuren door in te gaan tegen de bestaande spelregels en taalspelen, en gehele nieuwe taalspelen te produceren. Daarvoor zou, zo vreest Lyotard, geen plaats meer zijn binnen deze postmoderne vorm van wetenschap. Daartegenover plaats Lyotard een ander model van wetenschap (zonder terug te willen grijpen op een metanarratief). Het model dat Lyotard voorstelt is dat van ''paralogie''. Dit verwijst naar een zet voorbij of naast (''para-'') de rede (''-logos''). Juist zoals Lyotards ideaalbeeld van de heidense of postmoderne kunstenaar, zou ook de postmoderne wetenschap moeten bestaan uit het verkennen van nieuwe taalspelen die tegen de bestaande kaders inaan. Lyotard argumenteert zelfs dat zulke vormen van kennisproductie vandaag de dag al bestaan binnen de wetenschap, ondanks de dominatie van het performativiteitscriterium. Hij ziet het vooral aan het werk in vormen van [[cybernetica]] en [[chaostheorie]] die actief onstabiliteiten onderzoeken (hij denkt aan het werk van auteurs zoals [[Ilya Prigogine]] of [[René Thom]]).
Lyotard’s choice of language games is primarily political in motivation, and relates to the close links between knowledge and power. In examining the status of knowledge in postmodernity, Lyotard is examining the political as well as epistemological aspects of knowledge (legitimation), and he sees the basic social bond – the minimum relation required for society to exist – as moves within language games. Lyotard needs a methodological representation to apply to society in order to examine the status of knowledge in postmodern societies. He presents us with two alternative views of society that have been popular in this century: society as a unitary whole (“traditional” theory) or society as a binary division (“critical” theory). Lyotard rejects both of these alternatives on the grounds that the choice seems difficult or arbitrary, and also rejects a third alternative – that we might distinguish two kinds of equally legitimate knowledge, one based on the view of society as unitary and the other on the view of society as binary. This division of knowledge is caught within a type of oppositional thinking that Lyotard believes is out of step with postmodern modes of knowledge.
Instead of the recently popular or “modern” models of society, Lyotard argues that even as the status of knowledge has changed in postmodernity, so has the nature of the social bond, particularly as it is evident in society’s institutions of knowledge. Lyotard presents a postmodern methodological representation of society as composed of multifarious and fragmented language games, but games which strictly (but not rigidly – the rules of a game can change) control the moves which can be made within them by reference to narratives of legitimation which are deemed appropriate by their respective institutions. Thus one follows orders in the army, prays in church, questions in philosophy, etc., etc. In his analysis of the state of knowledge in postmodernity, Lyotard firstly distinguishes between two types of knowledge – “narrative” knowledge and “scientific” knowledge. Narrative knowledge is the kind of knowledge prevalent in “primitive” or “traditional’ societies, and is based on storytelling, sometimes in the form of ritual, music and dance. Narrative knowledge has no recourse to legitimation – its legitimation is immediate within the narrative itself, in the “timelessness” of the narrative as an enduring tradition – it is told by people who once heard it to listeners who will one day tell it themselves. There is no question of questioning it. Indeed, Lyotard suggests that there is an incommensurability between the question of legitimation itself and the authority of narrative knowledge.
In scientific knowledge, however, the question of legitimation always arises. Lyotard says that one of the most striking features of scientific knowledge is that it includes only denotative statements, to the exclusion of all other kinds (narrative knowledge includes other kinds of statements, such as prescriptives). According to the “narrative” of science, however, only knowledge which is legitimated is legitimate – i.e. is knowledge at all. Scientific knowledge is legitimated by certain scientific criteria – the repeatability of experiments, etc. If the entire project of science needs a metalegitimation, however (and the criteria for scientific knowledge would itself seem to demand that it does) then science has no recourse but to narrative knowledge (which according to scientific criteria is no knowledge at all). This narrative has usually taken the form of a heroic epic of some kind, with the scientist as a “hero of knowledge” who discovers scientific truths. The distinction between narrative and scientific knowledge is a crucial point in Lyotard’s theory of postmodernism, and one of the defining features of postmodernity, on his account, is the dominance of scientific knowledge over narrative knowledge. The pragmatics of scientific knowledge do not allow the recognition of narrative knowledge as legitimate, since it is not restricted to denotative statements). Lyotard sees a danger in this dominance, since it follows from his view that reality cannot be captured within one genre of discourse or representation of events that science will miss aspects of events which narrative knowledge will capture. In other words, Lyotard does not believe that science has any justification in claiming to be a more legitimate form of knowledge than narrative. Part of his work in The Postmodern Condition can be read as a defence of narrative knowledge from the increasing dominance of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, Lyotard sees a danger to the future of academic research which stems from the way scientific knowledge has come to be legitimated in postmodernity (as opposed to the way it was legitimated in modernity).
In modernity the narrative of science was legitimated by one of a number of metanarratives, the two principal ones being respectively Hegelian and Marxist in nature. The Hegelian metanarrative speculates on the eventual totality and unity of all knowledge; scientific advancement is legitimated by the story that it will one day lead us to that goal. The Marxist metanarrative gives science a role in the emancipation of humanity. According to Lyotard, postmodernity is characterised by the end of metanarratives. So what legitimates science now? Lyotard’s answer is – performativity. This is what Lyotard calls the “technological criterion” – the most efficient input/output ratio. The technical and technological changes over the last few decades – as well as the development of capitalism – have caused the production of knowledge to become increasingly influenced by a technological model. It was during the industrial revolution, Lyotard suggests, that knowledge entered into the economic equation and became a force for production, but it is in postmodernity that knowledge is becoming the central force for production. Lyotard believes that knowledge is becoming so important an economic factor, in fact, that he suggests that one day wars will be waged over the control of information.
Lyotard calls the change that has taken place in the status of knowledge due to the rise of the performativity criterion the mercantilization of knowledge. In postmodernity, knowledge has become primarily a saleable commodity. Knowledge is produced in order to be sold, and is consumed in order to fuel a new production. According to Lyotard knowledge in postmodernity has largely lost its truth-value, or rather, the production of knowledge is no longer an aspiration to produce truth. Today students no longer ask if something is true, but what use it is to them. Lyotard believes that computerization and the legitimation of knowledge by the performativity criterion is doing away with the idea that the absorption of knowledge is inseparable from the training of minds. In the near future, he predicts, education will no longer be given “en bloc” to people in their youth as a preparation for life. Rather, it will be an ongoing process of learning updated technical information that will be essential for their functioning in their respective professions.
Lyotard does not believe that the innovations he predicts in postmodern education will necessarily have a detrimental effect on erudition. He does, however, see a problem with the legitimation of knowledge by performativity. This problem lies in the area of research. Legitimation by performativity lends itself to what Lyotard calls “terror” – the exclusion of players from language games or the exclusion of certain games entirely. Most true “discoveries,” Lyotard argues, are discoveries by virtue of the fact that they are so radical that they change the rules of the game – they cannot even be articulated within the rules of the “dominant” game (which is dominant because it draws the consensus of opinions). Many discoveries are not found to have a use until quite some time after they are made; therefore they seem to be of little value by the performativity criterion. Furthermore, for economic reasons, legitimation by performativity tends to follow the consensus opinion – that which is perceived by the majority of experts to have the most efficient input/output ratio is considered most likely in fact to be most performatively efficient, and hence the safest investment.
Lyotard argues that legitimation by performativity is against the interests of research. He does not claim that research should be aimed at production of “the truth”; he does not try to re-invoke the metanarratives of modernity to legitimate research. Rather, he sees the role of research as the production of ideas. Legitimation of knowledge by performativity terrorises the production of ideas. What, then, is the alternative? Lyotard proposes that a better form of legitimation would be legitimation by paralogy. The etymology of this word resides in the Greek words para – beside, past, beyond – and logos in its sense as “reason.” Thus paralogy is the movement beyond or against reason. Lyotard sees reason not as a universal and immutable human faculty or principle but as a specific and variable human production; “paralogy” for him means the movement against an established way of reasoning. In relation to research, this means the production of new ideas by going against or outside of established norms, of making new moves in language games, changing the rules of language games and inventing new games. Lyotard argues that this is in fact what takes place in scientific research, despite the imposition of the performativity criterion of legitimation. This is particularly evident in what Lyotard calls “postmodern science” – the search for instabilities [see Science and Technology]. For Lyotard, knowledge is not only the known but also the “revelation” or “articulation” of the unknown. Thus he advocates the legitimation of knowledge by paralogy as a form of legitimation that would satisfy both the desire for justice and the desire for the unknown. ---->
=== Het geschil ===
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