Hoessein-McMahoncorrespondentie: verschil tussen versies
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Regel 9:
In McMahons tweede brief van [[24 oktober]] [[1915]] beloofde hij steun aan de Arabische onafhankelijkheid, met enkele beperkingen:
:''The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation.''
:''Subject to that modification, and without prejudice to the treaties concluded between us and certain Arab Chiefs, we accept that delimitation.''<br />
:''As for the regions lying within the proposed frontiers, in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to interests of her ally France, I am authorized to give you the following pledges on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, and to reply as follows to you note:''
:''That subject to the modifications stated above, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca.''
In andere passages in dezelfde brief refereert McMahon aan het feit dat de Arabieren exclusief advies moeten krijgen van de Britse overheid, een vage verwijzing naar de belangen van het [[Verenigd Koninkrijk]] in het Arabische gebied. De verwijzing naar de gebieden die nu [[Syrië]] en [[
In de brief werd dus geen uitzondering gemaakt voor [[Palestina]]. Het [[Sandjak van Jeruzalem]], dat twee derde van Palestina besloeg, lag ten zuiden van de genoemde gebieden. Zowel de Arabieren als het Verenigd Koninkrijk gingen er toen van uit dat Palestina bij de Arabieren zou horen, iets waar de Britse regering later op terug zou komen.
Hoessein maakte in zijn laatste brief van 1 januari 1916 duidelijk McMahons beperkingen alleen tijdelijk te accepteren tot na afloop van de oorlog:
:''As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done so to fulfill those aspirations whose attainment is desired by the will of the Blessed and Supreme God. It is this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present wars and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to day) for what we now leave to France in beirut and its coasts.''<br />
:''I do not find it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that our plan is of greater security to the interests and protection of the rights of Great Britain than it is to us, and will necessarily be so whatever may happen, so that Great Britain may finally see her friends in that contentment and advancement which she is endeavouring to establish for them now, especially as her Allies being neighbours to us will be the germ of difficulties and discussion with which there will be no peaceful conditions. In addition to which the citizens of Beirut will decidedly never accept such dismemberment, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which may exercise Great Britain, certainly not less than her present troubles, because of our belief and certainty in the reciprocity and indeed the identity of our interests, which is the only cause that caused us never to care to negotiate with any other Power but you. Consequently, it is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.''
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