Gebruiker:Krisgrotius/klad: verschil tussen versies

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* [[Gebruiker:Krisgrotius/klad2|klad2]]

| afbeelding = [[Image:Naval Ensign of Japan.svg|250px|border]]

| onderschrift = Vlag van de Japanse Keizerlijke Marine

De marineluchtmacht stond onder het bevel van de [[Generale staf van de Japanse Keizerlijke Marine|Generale staf]] van de [[Japanse Keizerlijke Marine]] en van het [[Ministerie van de Marine]]. De Japanse Keizerlijke Marineluchtmacht had een gelijkaardige functie als de [[Fleet Air Arm]] van de Britse [[Royal Navy]], de luchtmachtafdeling van de [[United States Navy]], de ''[[Aviazione Ausiliara per la Marina]]'' van de Italiaanse [[Regia Marina]] of de ''[[Marineluchtvaartdienst van de Sovjet-Unie|Marineluchtvaartdienst]]'' van de [[Marine van de Sovjet-Unie]].

Het luchtvaartbureau van de Japanse Keizerlijke Marine (''Kaigun Koku Hombu'') was verantwoordelijk voor de ontwikkeling en de training.

De Japanse militairen verkregen hun eerste vliegtuig in 1910. Ze volgden tevens de ontwikkeling van and followed the development of air combat during [[World War I]] with great interest. They initially procured European aircraft but quickly built their own and launched themselves onto an ambitious aircraft carrier building program. They launched the world's first purpose-built aircraft carrier, [[Japanese aircraft carrier Hōshō|''Hōshō'']], in 1922. Afterwards they embarked on a conversion program of several excess battlecruisers and battleships into aircraft carriers. The IJN Air Service had the mission of national air defence, deep strike, naval warfare, and so forth. It retained this mission to the end.

The Japanese pilot training program was very selective and rigorous, producing a high-quality and long-serving pilot corps, who ruled the air in the Pacific during early World War II. However, the long duration of the training program, combined with a shortage of gasoline for training, did not allow the Navy to rapidly provide qualified replacements in sufficient numbers. Moreover, the Japanese, unlike the U.S. or Britain, proved incapable of altering the program to speed up training of the recruits they got. The resultant decrease in quantity and quality, among other factors, resulted in increasing casualties toward the end of the war.